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L6ROY COLLIN,; !@ LBGI:.JLA'riVJ') IN'rl'.)HP00I'riON:

A POH'rRAI'r OF

0~fWING

MODBH.ATION IN GUBJ')H.NA'rORIAL

POLI'riCJ

After the United States Supreme Court rendered its
unanimous decision in the May 1954 Brown v, Board of 0ducation
of 'ropelm case, many Deep South politicians sought to delay
integration by embracing the concept of "massive resistance",
Chief Justice 1'/arren asserted that the equal protection of the
laws

provided for by the Fourteenth Amendment prevented the

oonstitutional establishment of separate public schools based
upon race, Southern governors and legislators immediately contended that the \'larren Court wantonly usurped powers delegate<! to
the states, But when LeRoy Collins became Florida's thirty-third
Governor since statehood, he defended the system of federalism
inherent to American politics, During Collins's governorship from
1955 to 1961, Florida did avoid much of the violence associated
with militant segregationists throughout Dixie, However, Florida
joined other Southern states in adopting an interposition
resolution, By examining Collins's efforts to impede the passage
of an interposition resolution in the legislature, an emerging
trend towards moderation in his gubernatorial statecraft ma.y be
observed,
LeRoy Collins, like most Florida governors of this
century, inherited a dual system of schools which originated in
the Bourbon Era following the Compromise of 1877. Although
Florida 1 s governors and legislative bodies appropris.ted Shlfficient funds to build new schools and provide social services
during Republican Reconstruction, Bourbon Democrats believed
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that railroad construction, capital investment, a.nd a reduction
dJn taxes should take precedence over social needs. At the 1885
constitutional convention, Bourbon leaders attempted to legally
provide for separate and equal schools, a move unheard-of in
Reconstruction Gra documents. 1 Article XII, 8ection 12 of the
final draft of the 1885 constitution legitimized school segregation.

A monumental Clupreme Court decision in 1896 and statutes
subsequently enacted in Tallahassee reinforced constitutiona.l
segregation. In Plessy v. Ferguson the Supreme Court upheld
Jim Grow laws by claiming that "separate but equal" facilities
did not infringe upon the equal protection of the laws guar·anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, By 1939, the legislature enacted
sta,tutes providing for: separ<B:te private, public, and parochial
schools, as well as postsecondary institutions, based upon race;
the assignment of white and black teachers only to schools with
pupils of the same race; and the prohibiti8n cf integrated
summer schools or institutes for teachers. 2 Indeed, the only
statutory exception of legislated segregation in Florida's dual
school systems was a provision permitting boards of public
instruction to hire white supervismrs to oversee black schools
and teachers,
The Supreme Court 1,s decision in Brown v. Bonrd of Bducaj;i,.£!2
of Topeka threatened the institutionalized segregation found in
Florida's scho0ls, The justices asserted that dual school
systems based upon race violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Southern politicians summarily rebuked the Court, claiming that
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the Brown decision was a blasphemous invasion of states'
rights, Floridians, however, generally neacted to the judgment
with moderation.due to the state's demography, Compared to
neighboring Deep South states, Florida's population included a
smaller percentage of blacks, numerous transient residents living
along the urbanized peninsula, and a significant number of'
residents employed in the tourist-based economy. 3
But the Brown decision did not provide timely redr~is for
the inequities caused by segregation, 'l'he \1arren Court 1 s verdict
failed to answer three important questions: when desegregation
would begin, how school systems would be required to comply with
the order, and when complete desegregation would be.mandatory. 4
In response to Brown, Attorney General Richard Ervin of Florida
filed an amicus curiae brief with the Court,in 1954. Ervin
claimed that the educational system based upon Article XII,
Section 12, of the 1885 constitution could not be altered suddenly
without detrimental effects on over 650,000 pupils and a budget
of nearly $140-million,5

He added that Section 230,23 of the

statutes required physical plant location, construction, and
operations to be based upon the constitutionally-mandated dual
school systems, 6 Therefore, the immediate abandonment of
separ<llte schools would require both extensive planning and
significant capital expenditures.
Although Florida's demographic composition differed from
other Southern states, legislators in Tallahassee struggled to
maintain racial segregation in schools and other social settings.
A year before the Brown decision, Senator Charley Johns of Starke

sought to create a legislative investigation committee to combat
criminal and gambling interests, Then-Governor Dan McCarty and
Senator LeRoy Collins fought the proposal. 7 Johns wanted this
committee to have broad investigative powers, but his plan
received little legislative support until he designed it to
espouse pro-segregationists' sentiments, 8 The legislature passed
an act authorizing this committee - - known widely as the Johns's
Committee - - t o investigate subversive activities in Florida.
Policy decisions were made in McCarthyi te fashion: closed door
sessions, the withholding of prelimina.ry findings, and the
forbidding of members to make public statements without the
chairma.n's approval prevented the disclosure of many of the
committee's undertakings,9

Without a doubt, the Johns's Committee

would become an impediment to integration efforts after the Brown
decision,
Governor Dan McCarty died only eight months after his
1953 inauguration, allowing Senate President Charley Johns to
assume the governorship until a general election could be held
in 1954. Since Senator Collins was a close friend of Governor
McCarty, he detested Johns's dismissal of McCarty appointees,
According to Tom Wagy's political biography, LeRoy Collins provided strong backing for statewide educational reform since his
first term in the legislature in 1935, 1
Collins did not believe

°

th~the

Johns Administration would continue to advocate integrity

in government, as McCarty promised to do, Fearing that rural
porkchoppers would undermine Collins's desire to provide equitable
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representation and services for burgeoning urban constituencies,
he entered the 1954 primary to unseat Johns,
In the 1954 Democra.tia primary, Johns and Brailey Odha.m
pledged to maintain ''separate but equal'' facilities, while
Collins promised to uphold segregation if it did not conflict
with the law of the land. 11 Since Collins reaeived a plurality
instead of a majority, a second primary was scheduled between
Collins and runner-up Johns. Collins acknowledged that segregation was an essential part of Florida's custom and law: he
believed that the state executive must support segregation under
*he terms of the constitution of 1885. During his campaign,
Collins assured

Florid~a.ns

that he would maintain the dual

school system through powers accorded to the governorship. 12
Collins defeated Johns in the second primary and handily
won in November, In his inaugural address, Collins attempted to
persuade divergent factions to unite and meet the state's
growing needs, He asserted that:
Our opportunities call for dynamic and vigorous
leadership by all those in public authority. There
is no place under our sun for a demagogue. \'/e must
discard the false prophets who would array little
counties against big counties, section against
section, and class against class. We must be
united as one people seeking a. common destiny in
13
the advancement of all.
But did this message apply to the educational opportunities of
blacks?
As governor, LeRoy Collins embraced the concept of
federalism, namely, the division of authority between the
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national government and the respective states, However, the
Brown decision tempered his support of the federal judiciary,
In Aprli!l 1955 Collins addressed the possibility of mandatory
segregation by expounding to the legislature:
If, a.t some later time, it appears that the
State will be subjected to harsh treatment in
the attempted enforcement of any edict or
decision of the Supreme Court in this field and
that our position can be aided through the
enactment of legislation, then this whole
subject will be reviewed in the light of such
14
developments.
Collins signed the 1955 Pupil Assignment Law, demonstrating his
commitment tb segregation by legal means, 1 5 Throughout the
South, however, politicians began to abandon their passive denial
of the Supreme Court 1 s au:Uhori ty, instead advocating "massive
resistance", Before long, legislatures throughout Dixie would
introduce interposition resolutions in protest of Brown,
Interposition and nullification derived from the tenets of
of states 1 rights formulated by '.rhomas Jefferson and James
Madison, To Jeffersonians, the central government was simply
created by a compact between sovereign states, with individual
states retaining authority to determine the legitimacy of any
federal act, 16 Although the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
of 1798 and 1799 provided the earliest examples of interposition,
in protest of the Alien and Sedition Laws, Federalists did
continue to enforce these acts. 17
Three Supreme Court decisions in the early nineteenth
century further weakened the validity of legislative interposition.
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In the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court
declared that it alone ultimately determined the constitutionality of federal acts. Six years later, Chief

Justi~e

John

Marshall invalidated the notion of interposition in United
States v. Peters, Finally, in the 1816 case of Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, the justiaes asserted that an affirmation of constitutions,li ty by the Supreme Court annul:!J a declaration of unconsti tutionality by any state body, 18 Since interposition might inevitably
be followed by nullification and secession, as espoused by John
Calhoun as a legal means for the South to withdraw from the
Union, any judicial pronouncement regarding secession would
necessarily affect interposition and nullification. 19
By early 1956 Southern legislators introduced interposition resolutions to protest the Brown decision. Unlike
previous attempts to interpose state authority, these resolutions
sought to nullify a Supreme Court decision instead of an act of
'
20
Congress,

In January 1956, the Virginia General Assembly

considered an interposition act that passed as a joint resolution
within three weeks of introduction. But the state's attorney
general realized that Virginians could not legally nullify a
Supreme Court decision to delay its implementation. 21 Governor
Collins noted that Virgin&a 1 s legislature simply registered a
protest, adding that Virginia permitted blaclm to enroll in each
of its state universities, 22
Governor Collins realized that interposition resolutions
would neither coerce the Supreme Court nor rescincl the Brown
decision. He believed that Florida should adopt the position of
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"gradualism" proposed by Attorney General Richard .8rv in in his
1954 amicus curiae brief. Collins possessed the foresight to
understand that the custom of segregated facilities could not
continue interminably, According to 'J'om 1'/agy, Collins did not
want to jeopardize his platforms of reapportionment and constitutional revision by publicly claiming that segregation would
not last; ,however, when the Florida Supreme Court permitted him
to run for a complete term in 1956, he continued to ad vocate
legal means for preserving segregated classrooms, 2)
'J'he 1956 Democratic gubernatorial primary focused on
the issue of race, In February 1956, Sumter Lowry advocated that
J!,lorida join other states and provide a "united front" and adopt
an interposition resolution to demonstrate that Florida was not
willing to enforce the Court's decision, 24 Another candidate,
Fuller 1'/arren, hoped to become governor, having served a full
term in that capacity from 1949 to 1953. Warren contended that
interposition could not work unless Lowry would be willing to
withdraw, l'lorida from the Union and win the war that would
follow. 25 Collins did not enter the contest until March 23, 1956.
On March 11, ninety-six Congressmen signed the "Declaration
of Constitutional Principles'' - - better known as the Southern
Manifesto - - to protest Supreme Court decisions regarding
segregation. 26 Governor Collins recognized that Southerners who
advocated resistance could imperil Florida's demographic and
economic growth, Additionally, he believed that the Supreme
Court should not be defied, even if i t rendered an unpopular
verdict, 27 In a monthly radio and television broadcast on
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March 12, Collins addressed the possibility of interposition
I

by saying:
Now if the Legislature of FloFida wants to consider the adoption of such a resolution • • •
this will be its privilege when it next convenes,
I don't think that procedure can possibly have
sufficient effect to justify the calling of a
28
special (legislative) session,
Later in the message, Collins discussed the ramifications of
interposition, stating:
Some people have gotten the wrong impression
about interposition, It cannot mean, of course,
that the State of Florida or any other State
can say the decision of the United States
Supreme Court is applicable to ce.rtai n areas
but not to Florida or other states, That would
be the same as saying that for limited purposes, we will secede from the Union and that
question has been settled as we all well know. 29
On Ma.rch 21, Collins participated in a conference prompted
by the March 12 United States Supreme Court decision permitting
Virgil Hawkins, a black student, to enroll at the University of
Florida Law School. Collins continued to argue that the individual
states should devise timetables for integration without excessive
federal oversight, Collins praised Floridians for following the
proper course, adding that the decision was "repugnant to long
established law and an unwarranted invasion of state's (sic)
rights," 30
Two days later, Collins entered the race as a pro-segregationist, Sumter Lowry's persisting belief in interposition
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and the maintenance of segregation at any cost made race a
volatile issue in the 1956 Democratic gubernatorial primary;
Collins did not want to hold a debate with Lowry because he
feared that Lowry would use such a gathering as a sounding
board for his militant segregationist agenda, 31 Collins knew
the importance of winning the Democratic primary: except nor
Sidney Catts's victory in 1916 as a member of the Prohibitionist
Party, all previous twentieth century Florida governors won the
Democratic primary or runoff before assuming the governorship.
Candidates spent most of their funds to win the primary because
Republic·an contenders garnered few votes in the general election,
During the 1956 campaign, Collins responded to Lowry 1 s
aspersions by claiming that Floridians "overwhelmingly"
opposed integration, and he would support this ''firmly and
squarely" with tactful leadership if re-elected, 32 Although
Collins hoped to maintain dual schools if he won a second term,
he refused to support segregationist overtures such as interposition and nullification, according to David Colburn and
Richard Scher,33

Instead, his resounding victory in the primary

indicated that Floridians valued economic development and a
moderate stance on the race issue over pugnacious demagoguery.
Once Collins secured victory in the Democratic primary,
he again concentrated on the state 1 s affairs. 'l'he Board of
Control, forerunner to the State University

Sy~tem,

published an

alarming report entitled Stusl;y_ 2..!2 Desegregation, 'rhi s work
evaluated the demographic composition and facilities at the
state's three universities: University of Florida, Florida State
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University and Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University.
An appendix to the report included surveys of white and blacl<
high school seniors, Overwhelmingly, white respondents either
believed that blacks should be legally denied admission to white
universities, or not be admitted under any circumstances,
regardless of any Court decisions; whites residing in ruriliJl
counties generally hoped to maintain segregation more adamantly
than their urban counterparts, 34 Black participants, on the
other hand, stated that they should be admitted either immediately,
or after a reasonable period of time, 35 Thus while Collins
received a majority in the Democratic primary, he did not
necessarily receive a mandate on how to proceed with desegregation,
The legislature convened for an extraordinary session in
the summer of 1956. Legislators focused on the topic of race
relations, and Collins feared that an interposition resolution
might be proposed, He knew that rural porkchopper districts
constituted a majority in the malapportioned legislature, and a
high degree of factionalization prevented his Democratic
colleagues from viewing the state exeautive as a party leader,
In 'IIi lliam Havard and Loren Beth 1 s monograph on the rural-urban
chasm in the ]<'lorida Legislature, they determined that:
the more extreme types of segregationist legislation depend for their support in Florida on a
legislative apportionment which denies to a
majority of the population its fair share of
36
legislative seats.
As expected, the house of representatives considered an
interposition resolution, Collins, however, invoked a consti-
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tutional provision to adjourn the special session as Representative Farris Bryant's resolution neared passage on
August 1. 37 Wagy contended that the proposal of legislative
interposition, coupled with the •rallahassee bus boycott beginning
in May 1956, caused Collins to further re-evaluate his beliefs on
desegregation, 38 Collins's faith rested with the Fabisinski
Committee, a body created with his blessings to study legal
segregation measures. In Robert Akerman's dissertation on
moderation in Florida's politics, he claimed that:
Collins • , , was determined to prevent interposition from sullying the value of the
Fabisinski program. He felt that to couple
interposition with that program would undermine
its legal effectiveness by showing plainly that
the intent of the legislation was to avoid
compliance with the Supreme Court decision. 39
But the legislature did resolve, with Governor Collins's approval,
that the Supreme Court "had entered upon. a policy of substituting
the personal and individual ideas of the members of the court
as to what the Constitution of the United States should be,'' 40
Before 0oililins adjourned the special session, legislators
approved the (Johns's) Florida Legislative Investigation Committee
and a stronger Fabisinski Plan. 41 The Johns's Committee tried
to prove that the Communi:llt Party acted in complicity by assisting
th.e National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
in litigation efforts against the government. Meanwhile, the
Fabisinski Committee established its goals in the 1956 "School
Assignment Law", namely: to maintain the state's public schools,
JC
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determine the best educational interests for Florida's pupils,
mitigate hostilities between classes or groups of citizens, abide
by both federal and state constitutions, and effect appropriate
legislative measures, 42 J. Lewis Hall, a member of the committee,
believed that the Supreme Court construed the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide egual facilities
and opportunities, not identical facilities and opportunities. 43
The 1956 "School Assignment Law", contained in Chapter
31380, Section 2, of the Florida Laws, represented this
philosophy embod.i ed by the llabi si nski Committee. County boards
of instruction were required to enroll pupils based upon ''orderly
and efficient administration", effective teaching, and the
consideration of "health, safety, education, and general welfare"
through attendance zones and bus routes; placement tests could
classify students into groups, with the board measuring sociological and psychological factors of pupil placement. 44 Thus,
while Brown prohibited classification by race, the l"abi si nski
Committee argued that it did not forbid states the right to
classify by other reasonable bases, such as aptitude and scholastic
p111oficiency. 45
As Governor Collins addressed the 1957 Biennial Legislature, he anticipated the passage of an interposition resolution.
To mollify the legisla.tors, Collins commended the programs
approved during the 1956 special session, asserting:
I repeat my conviction that this legislation
is the best that any Southern State has devised,
I do not recommen& that it be changed or that we
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go beyond it. Competent counsel advise that
going further might only destroy its integrity.4 6
Collins nevertheless acknowledged that the persistence of racial
segregation would only hinder Florida's development. He proclaimed that:
Good standards of morality, he<llth, and citizenship, the influence of which is not confined to
color lines, do not develop in the child who
grows up in a filthy, over-crowded shack under
47
the guidance of illiterate parents,
Collins possessed the fortitude to tell Jl'loridians that hatred and
violence could not supplant the authority accorded to the Supreme
Court to correct socia,l injustice, 48 Although Collins implored
the legislature to follow a moderate path, interposition resolutions appeared in both houses on the second day of the session. 4 9
House Concurrent Resolution 174 immediately passed on a
voice vote. 'rhis resolution claimed tha,t the legislature would
defend the state and federal constitutions

aga~nst

invasions of

state sovereignty. The legislators believed that federal powers
evolved from a compact between states, and federal powers
carried validity only within the context of this compact; since
the Supreme Court emerged as a "creature of the compact", they
assumed that it could not ameliorate differences between the
federal and state governments,5°

The legislators therefore

resolved that:
The State of Florida has at no time surrendered
to the General Government its right to exercise
its powers in the field of labor, criminal procedure, and public education, and to maintain
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racially separate public schools and other
public facilities;
The State of Florida, in ratifying the Four-\i
teenth Amendment to the Constitution, did not
agree , , , that the power to regulate labor,
criminal proceedings, public education, and to
operate racia.lly separate public schools and
other facilities was to be prohibited to them
there by , , ,
The Legislature of Florida asserts that whenever the General Government attempts to engage
in the deliberate, palpable and dangerous
exercise of powers not granted to it, the
States , , , are in duty bound to interpose
, , , for maintaining , , , the authorities,
rights, and liberties appertaining to them, 51
Governor Collins reacted unfavorably as the house of
representatives passed the resolution, Although the senate voted
down Senate Concurrent Resolution 72, Collins knew that an interposition resolution would surely pass in due time, Colburn and
Scher claimed that Collins could not jeopardize his entire
legislative program to prevent an interposition resolution from
receiving approval in both houses,5 2
After the senate voted down the original resolution, a
second resolution surprisingly endorsed by Attorney General Ervin
reached the floor, .Ervin exchanged gradualism for i nterposi ti on
because he believed that the l"lorida ::.>upreme Court 1 s refusal to
uphold a United States Supreme Court mandate admitting Virgil
Hawkins to the University of l!,lorida was "an i nterposi ti on
resolution of sorts 11 • 55 Ervin aided the resolution's pa.ssage by
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stating that it heldAlegal significance, but might convince
the Supreme Court that just cause existed to reconsider the
Brown decision. 54
After its passage in the senate, Governor Collins sent
copies of the resolution to governors and legislatures in each
state, as well as to the President, both houses of Congress,
and the Supreme Court, Upon forwarding the resolution, Collins
added a message stating that:
Under our rules and laws, a resolution of this
nature is not subject to approving or disaproving action by the Governor, nor does it have
the force and effect of law. I have nevertheless
made it clear that I oppose this action to the
extent that the same defies the authority of the
?5
United States Supreme Court,
On the original document, Collins penned:
This concurrent resolution of 'Interposition'
crosses the Governor's desk as a matter of
routine. I have no authotity to veto it. I
take this means however to advise the student
of government (that I) expressed open and
vigorous opposition thereto , , , Not only will
I not condone 'Interposition' as so many have
sought me to do, I decry it as an evil thing
• • • If history judges me right this day,
I want it known that I did my best to avert
this blot, If I am judged wrong, then here in
my own handwriting and over my signs.ture is
56
proof of guilt to support my conviction.
Collins decried the resolution!s passage, believing that
the Fabisinski Plan provided a means of delaying segregation
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without openly defying the Supreme Court's authority. The
Fabisinski Committee studied the efficacy of legislative interposition and discovered that similar measures failed in other
states,57

J, Lewis Hall of the Fabisinski Committee concluded

that:
those who advocate interposition as a
solution to our problems are merely refusing
to face the realities of the situation,, ••
A decision of the Supreme Court cannot be
ignored.-- it must be recognized, It should
not be unlawfully evaded ·and its effect will
not di sa.ppear by passage of an i nterposi ti on
resolution or by act of a state legislature
that in essence says the decision does not
58
exist,
During the 1957 session, legislators also considered a
11

last resort" school closing bill. Again, Attorney General Ervin

favored passage of this extreme measure, in contrast to the
gradualism he propounded three years earlier, Collins and School
Superintendent 'l'homas Bailey opposed this legislation, with
Collins vetoing the bill on June 6, 1957; legislators failed to
override his veto two days later.59 This bill reappeared during a
special legislative session ualled by Collins to discuss
constitutional reform on September 30, 1957. Collins signed the
Little Rock Bill with the intention that it would not be needed, 60
'rhis act called for the closure of any public school requiring
the intervention of the federal militia,
Collins's hesitation in signing the bill illustrated the
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extent of his conviction to

mainta~n

Florida's system of

public education, His previous acceptance of segregation conflicted with the possibility that Florida's schools could be
closed to prevent integration, At the Southern Governors'
Conference on September

2) -

-

a week before the special

session - - Collins spoke about the possibilitS of a Southerner
becoming President, He emphasized that such a Southerner must
recognize decisions of the Supreme Court as th<e law of the
land and handle relations in a calm and constructive manner. 61
'ro Collins, a Southern candidate who contentiously advocated
"massive resistance" would harm the 0outh. Likewise, Collins
adduced that circumventing integration through the closure of
school~

would punish innocent children, not promote the social

well-being of the South, In a message to the 1959 legislature,
Collins expounded:
I urge you never, never, never set up any
plan or device by wh;i:Gh our public schools
can be closed, \'/hen you put a padlock on a
school you padlock minds - - the minds of
children. Our children are in a very real
sense a part of us, But more than this they
62
are our whole hope for the future.
By the fall of 1957, Collins exuded moderation on the race
issue unknown to most Southern politicians. Although the legislature :).edged its protest through the enactment of an interposition resolution, much of the violence found in Little Rock
- - and throughout Dixie - - did not occur in .!<'lorida. Also,
Collins's judicious administration of the state government

prevented the usurpation of power by legislative witch-hunts
such as the Johns's Committee, At the end of the 1957 legislative session, the Johns's Committee still could not effectively
curb N.A.A,C.P. activities and lega,l assistance to expedite
integration. 63
A

speech given by Governor Collins on February 1, 1958,

indicated a revision of his beliefs since the 1955 inauguration.
He spoke at the Jefferson r+ Jackson Da,y Dinner, a fund-raiser
for the North Carolina Democratic Party. Collins balanced
between the preservation of states' rights and the moral treatment of racial minorities by stating:
'rhe two 'greatest influences now destroying
our nation's spirit of unity seem to me to
be our failure to achieve an understanding
about the segregation problem and to obtain
the acceptance of a sound states' rights
philosophy • • • Justice can never walk handin-hand with legally coerced racial discrim64
ination - - in any part of our land,
Collins added that many individuals attacked policies because
''states' rights offered an effective smokescreen to conceal
their real motives,'' 6 5
In his presentation of an opening address at the Southern
Governors' Conference in September 1958, Collins called upon
other Southern leaders to follow the sensible path of moderation.
He did not presumptuously attempt to lecture to his colleagues
on how to deal with racial problems; he instead asked them to
search for solutions, not scapegoats, 66 He noted that the
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Supreme Court provided an essential foundation for the constitutional protections of all Americans, But he added that the
implementation',of Court decisions must consider the peculiarities
of individual communities, Thus, he believed that:
Congressional legislation should provide for
facilitating desegregation in individual
communities where and when it is feasible,
But it also should provide protection
against improvident, forced desegregation in
communities where and when it is not feasible
, , , Furthermore such a program must include
due recognition of, and respect for, the
sovereignty of the individual states and their
local responsibilities to maintain law and
order and to promote the g,eneral welfare of
67
all their citizens,
In conclusion, LeRoy Collins reappraised his beliefs on
the institutionalized social segregation of the South, While
Collins campaigned as a moderate segregationist in 1954 and 1956,
his moral convictions prevented him from denying the supremacy of
the federalist system; Colburn and Scher suggested that Collins 1 s
emphasis on upholding the law and his attempts to sustain peaceful
race relations in Florida quelled staunch segregationists who
demanded immediate interposition and nullification measures, 68
Thus when Sumter Lowry's 1956 gubernatorial campaign included
allegations that the N.A.A.C.P. wanted to desegregate schools in
an attempt to destroy the

u.s.

Constitution, Collins rebuked
Lowry and called for moderation, 6 9
Decidedly, Collins's statecraft postponed the passage of
an interposition resolution, and the threat of legislative
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interpooition caused Collins to continually reassess his racial
beliefs. Collins evinced an emerging trend towards moderation as
his legislative compatriots embraced interposition in defiance
of the Supreme Court. Florida's malapportioned legislature - a legacy of the agrarian hegemony expressed in the 1885 consti tution - - embraced the creed that any alleged encroachment by the
Supreme Court required an immediate, forceful response, Collins's
disdain of porkchopper legislators and his calls for reapportionment corresponded with the opposition h• faced by this rural
voting-bloc on the issue of interposition. Whereas about one-half
of the representatives from urban counties voted agadmst
interposition in 1957, only six of forty-seven house members
from rural counties rejected the resolution. 70
Florida became the last Southern state to enact such a
resolution. Colburn and 3cher attributed this delay to Collins's
sagacious and progressive leadership.7 1 They believed that his
sensible avdl!Lda.nce of the demagoguery imputed to fellow governors
allowed him to abide by his moral convictions and dramatically
protest the resiblution '-s passage in 1957. 72 Colburn and 3cher
concluded that:
While the passage of the interposition
resolution was a major defeat for his racial
polic:iies, it was his only one, and he never
allowed it to deter him from his efforts to
lead Florida in the direction which he thought
best promoted the interest of the entire
73
state, and all of its citizens.
Even after its passage seemed imminent, Collins nobly
decried the interposition resolution as a threat to federalism
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and the Supreme Court's sovereignty. His affirmation of the
Court's authority demonstrated a courage lacking among his fellow
Southern governors, Robert Akerman summarized that:
( Collibns) warned of the futility and danger of
defying the Court, as in his comments on
interposition , , , Collins admitted that
criticism of the Court was not necessarily
wrong, but indiscriminate attacks on the idea
of an independent judiciary were wrong,
74
LeRoy Collins of Florida brought esteem to the governorship, He demonstrated that the governor could bypass the legislature and collegial cabinet and appeal directly to the voters
through~radio

and television broadcasts, After leaving office,

Collins assumed the presidency of the Natfuonal Association of
Broadcasters, By 1964, :President Lyndon Johnson offered Collins
the directorship of the Community Relations Service, an agency
created under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A year later, Bxecutive
Director Roy Wilkins of the N.A.A.C,l'. addressed that organization's National Convention, He noted that:

We Negroes have come a rough way, We have
learned many thi llgs not written in books,
We have had the help of many a dedicated
friend, white as well as black, We now have
government with us and, here and there,
75
white Southerners,
Among white Southern politicians of his day, Governor LeRoy
Collins truly represented moderation and respect for the·,.law.
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